Transmission of toxigenic Corynebacterium diphtheriae by a fully immunised resident returning from a visit to West Africa, United Kingdom, 2017. by Edwards, D et al.
1www.eurosurveillance.org
Surveillance and outbreak report
Transmission of toxigenic Corynebacterium diphtheriae 
by a fully immunised resident returning from a visit to 
West Africa, United Kingdom, 2017
David Edwards¹, Dianne Kent¹, Caroline Lester¹, Colin Stewart Brown2, Michael E. Murphy3, Nicholas M. Brown4, Olajumoke 
Sule4, Alexandra Itani5, Meera Chand6, Amy Trindall7, Callum Pearson7, Iain Roddick7, Norman K. Fry2, Jorg Hoffmann1, 
Nalini Iyanger2, Laurence Kemp5, Joanne White², Babak Javid8, Isobel D. Ramsay8, Dominik Zenner2, Aliko Ahmed¹, Gayatri 
Amirthalingam⁹, Sultan Salimee1, David Litt2, Mark Reacher7
1. East of England Health Protection Team, Public Health England, Thetford, United Kingdom
2. National Infection Service, Public Health England, London, United Kingdom
3. Department of Microbiology, Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Cambridge, United Kingdom
4. PHE Public Health Laboratory Cambridge, Public Health England, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
5. Granta Medical Practices, Cambridge, United Kingdom
6. NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Respiratory Infections, Public Health England, London, United Kingdom
7. Field Epidemiology Service, Public Health England, Cambridge, United Kingdom
8. Department of Medicine, University of Cambridge School of Clinical Medicine, University of Cambridge Hospitals Trust, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom
9. Immunisation, Hepatitis and Blood Safety Department, National Infection Service, Public Health England, London, United 
Kingdom
Correspondence: David Edwards (david.s.edwards@phe.gov.uk)
Citation style for this article: 
Edwards David, Kent Dianne, Lester Caroline, Brown Colin Stewart, Murphy Michael E., Brown Nicholas M., Sule Olajumoke, Itani Alexandra, Chand Meera, 
Trindall Amy, Pearson Callum, Roddick Iain, Fry Norman K., Hoffmann Jorg, Iyanger Nalini, Kemp Laurence, White Joanne, Javid Babak, Ramsay Isobel D., Zenner 
Dominik, Ahmed Aliko, Amirthalingam Gayatri, Salimee Sultan, Litt David, Reacher Mark. Transmission of toxigenic Corynebacterium diphtheriae by a fully 
immunised resident returning from a visit to West Africa, United Kingdom, 2017. Euro Surveill. 2018;23(39):pii=1700681. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.
ES.2018.23.39.1700681 
Article submitted on 10 Oct 2017 / accepted on 23 May 2018 / published on 27 Sep 2018
In early 2017, a United Kingdom (UK)-born person in 
their 20s presented with a skin ulcer on the foot 3 
weeks after returning from Ghana. The patient had last 
received a diphtheria-containing vaccine in 2013, com-
pleting the recommended course. MALDI-TOF of a cuta-
neous swab identified  Corynebacterium diphtheriae. 
Real-time PCR ascertained the species and presence 
of the diphtheria toxin gene. An Elek test confirmed 
toxigenicity. The isolate was macrolide sensitive and 
penicillin resistant. The local Public Health England 
(PHE) Health Protection Team obtained the patient’s 
clinical history and traced contacts to inform appro-
priate public health action. One close contact (in their 
early 80s with uncertain immunisation status who 
had not recently travelled) had a positive throat swab 
for toxigenic  C. diphtheriae  and reported a history of 
mild coryzal symptoms. Multilocus sequence typing 
revealed that strains from the index case and contact 
had Sequence Type 463. Diphtheria is extremely rare 
in the UK due to high vaccine coverage and this is the 
first documented transmission in 30 years. Clinicians 
and laboratory staff should remain highly suspicious 
of lesions in overseas travellers, even when patients 
are fully vaccinated. Older individuals who might not 
have completed a full immunisation course may have 
higher diphtheria susceptibility.
Introduction
Diphtheria is a disease caused by toxin-producing 
strains of  Corynebacterium diphtheriae  and, in some 
cases, also by  C. ulcerans  bacteria [1]. It is transmit-
ted from person to person through close physical 
and respiratory contact. The early signs of respiratory 
diphtheria are sore throat, loss of appetite, and slight 
fever with classic symptoms including the develop-
ment of a white (turning to grey) membrane in the 
throat and on the tonsils [2]. Severe cases of diphthe-
ria may develop a swollen neck and obstructed airway. 
Cutaneous diphtheria lesions can be highly variable, 
including presentation as painful ulcers covered with a 
dark pseudomembrane, serous oozing lesions, or dry, 
nearly healed, scaly lesions [3].
Infection with toxigenic diphtheria is rare in the United 
Kingdom (UK); in 2016 there were six cases infected 
with toxigenic strains of corynebacteria reported in 
England, four  C. diphtheriae  and two  C. ulcerans  [4]. 
Diphtheria vaccination is highly effective and immu-
nisation coverage of the UK population remains high 
[5,6]. A review of UK diphtheria cases between 1986 
and 2008 found the majority had mild infections with 
the affected individuals either only being partially 
immunised, or fully immunised adults with waning 
immunity [7]. Sero-epidemiological studies have dem-
onstrated waning immunity among adults in the UK 
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Figure 
Timeline of swab samples and test results for toxin-positive Corynebacterium diphtheriae cases and close contactsa, East of 
England, January–March 2017 (n = 13)
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and other Western European countries, although this 
is not likely to present a risk of widespread disease re-
emergence [2].
In February 2017, the Public Health England (PHE) East 
of England Health Protection Team (HPT), which con-
ducts local disease surveillance and outbreak inves-
tigations, was advised that a potentially toxigenic 
isolate of  C. diphtheriae  had been isolated from a 
cutaneous lesion of an East of England resident. This 
article summarises the public health investigations 
and actions taken, and discusses their implications for 
future diphtheria outbreak investigations and policy.
Methods
Laboratory analyses
Skin swabs were inoculated on blood and cystine-lac-
tose-electrolyte deficient (CLED) agar plates and incu-
bated for 48 hours at 37 °C in 5% carbon dioxide. Throat 
swabs were inoculated on Staph/Strep selective agar 
and incubated for 24 hours at 37 °C in room air. Samples 
from patients with a request for  C. diphtheriae  were 
additionally inoculated on Hoyle’s tellurite medium and 
incubated for 48 hours at 37 °C in room air and evalu-
ated for growth of indicative grey/black organisms. 
Positive growth in culture was identified using Matrix 
Assisted Laser Desorption/Ionization–Time of Flight 
mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF; Bruker Corporation, 
Massachusetts, United States). Organisms identi-
fied as  C. diphtheriae  by MALDI-TOF were confirmed 
as C. diphtheriae containing the diphtheria toxin gene 
by real-time PCR directed against the  rpoB  gene and 
fragment A of the diphtheria toxin gene [8]. They were 
confirmed as toxigenic using the modified Elek test [9]. 
Sensitivity testing was performed using E-tests (bio-
Mérieux, Basingstoke, UK) inoculated on ISO-Sensitest 
agar supplemented with 5% defibrinated horse blood 
as per British Society for Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 
(BSAC) guidelines [10]. Resistance was tested against 
the following antibiotics: ciprofloxacin, clindamy-
cin, doxycycline, erythromycin, linezolid, penicillin, 
rifampicin and vancomycin. The cut-off values used to 
evaluate resistance were the European Committee on 
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) Clinical 
Breakpoints for  Corynebacterium  spp. [11]. Organisms 
were further characterised by multilocus sequence typ-
ing (MLST; with reference to  www.pubmlst.org/cdiph-
theriae/) and biovar determination (API Coryne test, 
bioMérieux, Basingstoke, UK) [12]. All agars described 
were obtained from Oxoid, Oxford, UK.
Management and investigation of cases and 
contacts
The management of suspected or confirmed diph-
theria cases and their close contacts was conducted 
according to the PHE’s national guidelines [13]. In gen-
eral, contacts were advised to seek medical attention 
if they become unwell and to self-monitor for 10 days 
from date of exposure. They were offered chemopro-
phylaxis and diphtheria toxoid containing vaccine in 
line with national guidance via their own GP services 
[13]. Demographical information (age and sex) and 
exposure details were collected routinely as part of 
the identification/interview process for close contacts. 
Close contacts were defined as those sleeping in the 
same household as the index case, kissing/sexual con-
tacts, healthcare workers who had direct exposure to 
respiratory droplets or secretions, or dressed cutane-
ous lesions, without appropriate personal protective 
TABLE
Demographics and immunisation status with diphtheria toxin vaccine for toxin-positive Corynebacterium diphtheriae cases 
(n = 2) and their close contactsa (n = 11), East of England, January–March 2017
Relationship to case Age group in years PPE worn Reported doses of diphtheria containing vaccine receivedb
Case 1 contacts
Case 1 11–20 NA Five
Case 2  
 
Non-GP practice contact 1
81–90 NA No record of any doses received
Non-GP practice contact 2 21–30 No Five
Non-GP practice contact 3 51–60 No No record of any doses received
Non-GP practice contact 4; HCW 41–50 No Five
GP practice contact HCW 1 31–40 No No vaccination information obtained
GP practice contact HCW 2 31–40 Unknown No vaccination information obtained
GP practice contact HCW 3 41–50 No No vaccination information obtained
GP practice contact HCW 4 51–60 No Five
GP practice contact HCW 5 51–60 No Five
Case 2 contacts
Non-GP practice contact 41–50 No One
GP practice contact HCW 6 51–60 No No vaccination information obtained
GP practice contact HCW 7 41–50 No One
HCW: healthcare worker; NA: not applicable; PPE: personal protective equipment.
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equipment. Further information on the vaccination his-
tory of cases and close contacts was obtained via a 
questionnaire. The travel history of a second case was 
obtained by direct interview by the HPT and entered 
onto clinical notes.
Results
Detection, care and investigation of the index 
case
The index case (Case 1) was a 20-year-old office worker 
who returned on 10 January 2017 from a three-week 
trip volunteering at an orphanage in Ghana. The patient 
had received all five doses of a diphtheria-containing 
vaccine according to the UK schedule with three doses 
in the first year of age, and booster dose at age 3 and 
14 years. After returning, she attended her GP surgery 
on several occasions (11, 16 and 18 January 2017) with 
suspected urinary tract infection (UTI) which settled 
with antibiotic therapy (flucloxacillin and nitrofuran-
toin) plus gastrointestinal symptoms and skin lesions 
diagnosed as infected bite wounds. On 30 January 
2017 the case presented to her GP surgery with ton-
sillitis (onset 27 January 2017) and two non-healing 
ulcers on her right foot. Superficial swabs of the skin 
lesions were taken by the GP for microbial culture, but 
because the patient was systemically well she was not 
prescribed any antibiotics on this occasion.
Skin swabs taken from the Case 1 on 30 January 2017 
grew a mixture of bacterial colonies. MALDI-TOF identi-
fied the most abundant organism as C. diphtheriae on 
09 February 2017. The hospital microbiology laboratory 
reported isolation of  C. diphtheriae  to the local PHE 
HPT and the PHE national clinical leads for diphtheria, 
and the isolate was referred to the PHE national diph-
theria reference laboratory for further analysis.
Case 1 was interviewed by the HPT on 09 February 
2017 to undertake a risk assessment of the likelihood 
of toxigenic disease and identify close contacts. She 
was advised to self-isolate until the results from toxi-
genicity testing on the isolate were available as she 
was considered clinically stable and did not meet cri-
teria for anti-toxin administration. On the same day a 
throat swab was taken from case 1 at her GP practice 
who prescribed erythromycin treatment.
The following day (10 February 2017), using real-time 
PCR, the national reference laboratory confirmed that 
the isolate was  C. diphtheriae  and that it possessed 
the diphtheria toxin gene.
On 11 February 2017, Case 1 was given a diphtheria 
toxoid-containing booster vaccination. The case was 
advised to continue self-isolation until two sets of 
negative clearance swabs (taken from nose, throat and 
skin lesions (if not healed)) were obtained 24 hours 
and 72 hours after completion of antibiotics, i.e. 24 
February 2017 and 27 February 2017. As for the throat 
swab taken on 09 February 2017, throat and nose 
swabs taken from Case 1 on 24 and 27 February 2017 
were all culture negative for C. diphtheriae (Figure). The 
cutaneous lesions had already healed by the end of the 
antibiotic treatment, so no further cutaneous swabs 
were obtained. 
The  C. diphtheriae  isolate from Case 1 was confirmed 
to be expressing diphtheria toxin (i.e. toxigenic) on 14 
February 2017. The results of further testing of the iso-
late in late February showed it to be resistant to peni-
cillin (MIC 1.0 mg/L) but susceptible to erythromycin.
Tracing and follow-up of contacts
Following confirmation on 10 February 2017 that the iso-
late from Case 1 was positive for a C. diphtheriae strain 
harbouring a toxin gene, active contact tracing was 
undertaken by the HPT according to PHE national guide-
lines [12]. Further details on the clinical history of the 
case were obtained from the GP practice clinical record 
as part of the investigation. On 10 February 2017, three 
close contacts (family and household) were identi-
fied. On 11 February 2017, as per national guidelines 
the close contacts were swabbed (nasopharyngeal, 
throat, and skin if any lesions present;  Figure). They 
were also prescribed erythromycin chemoprophylaxis 
and arrangements were made for booster diphtheria 
immunisation at the earliest opportunity.
One of the close contacts was an 81-year-old UK-born 
female with uncertain immunisation status who had 
not recently travelled. She reported a history of mild 
coryzal symptoms and her throat swab was subse-
quently shown to be positive for  C. diphtheriae  by 
culture and MALDI-TOF. Further testing (by PCR and 
modified Elek test) confirmed that this isolate was also 
toxigenic (Figure). This person was designated Case 2. 
She was initially prescribed erythromycin as chemo-
prophylaxis on 12 February 2018 along with the other 
close contacts, but did not tolerate it well due to gas-
trointestinal symptoms and was empirically switched 
to benzylpenicillin chemoprophylaxis by intramuscular 
injection on 14 February 2017. This was 6 days prior 
to the penicillin resistance result communication to 
the Incident Control Team (ICT) on 20 February 2017. 
Case 2 initially did not wish to take further antibiotics 
and eventually started her prescribed treatment with 
clarithromycin on 21 February 2017. She was advised to 
self-isolate until completion of treatment and the find-
ing of two consecutive negative clearance throat swab 
samples (taken on 6 and 8 March 2017). An additional 
close contact (family), a paediatric nurse, was identi-
fied on 12 February 2017 and excluded from clinical 
duties. This person attended their GP on 13 February 
2017 to be swabbed, prescribed chemoprophylaxis and 
receive a booster diphtheria immunisation.
On 15 February 2017 a further eight close contacts were 
identified, five of Case 1 and three of Case 2 (Table); 
these included seven GP practice healthcare workers 
(Figure). All received appropriate screening, chemo-
prophylaxis and booster diphtheria immunisation. The 
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seven healthcare workers were excluded from clinical 
work until negative throat swabs had been obtained. 
This had a substantial impact on the GP practice, which 
had to cancel a number of patient appointments due to 
unexpected staff shortage. All throat swabs screened 
negative for C. diphtheriae. The immunisation status of 
cases (two women) and close contacts (seven women 
and four men) was investigated as part of the response 
to consider the value of booster vaccination as part 
of the post exposure prophylaxis. This identified that 
only one of the two cases had received five doses of 
diphtheria toxoid containing vaccine, and only four of 
11 close contacts, although vaccination history proved 
unobtainable for four close contacts, all of whom were 
healthcare workers.
Typing results
The bacterial isolates from Case 1 and Case 2 were both 
subsequently shown to be biovar mitis strains. MLST 
showed that they possessed the same novel sequence 
type (designated ST493; allelic profile 28,2,54,30,3,3,3), 
supporting a hypothesis of a single source and the epi-
demiological evidence of transmission.
Discussion
This is the first documented case of transmission 
of diphtheria within the UK in 30 years. The rarity of 
diphtheria in the country is attributed to an effective 
immunisation programme with sustained high vaccine 
coverage in the population. The last recorded transmis-
sion of toxigenic  C. diphtheriae  occurred in 1986 in a 
family of recent immigrants from Bangladesh [7]. In that 
instance, the cases were unimmunised, and both cuta-
neous and respiratory presentations were identified 
[7]. In the current event, the index case had a cutane-
ous infection. It is notable that transmission occurred 
despite the fact that this person was vaccinated.
In terms of risk factors for diphtheria in the UK, there 
have been documented cases following zoonotic expo-
sure to  C. ulcerans  from companion animals [4,14].  C. 
ulcerans infection is also a known occupational hazard 
following exposure to agricultural livestock [15]. 
For toxigenic  C. diphtheriae  however, the main risk 
factors are travel to an endemic country, close contact 
with a diphtheria case and being unvaccinated or 
under-vaccinated.
Indeed, there remain a number of countries, includ-
ing Ghana, where diphtheria is endemic, despite an 
improving immunisation coverage with diphtheria con-
taining vaccine (DTP) [16]. In our situation, the index 
case had travelled to such a country, but had received 
a primary course of three doses of diphtheria toxoid 
containing vaccine plus two booster doses of vaccine 
as per the current vaccination schedule [17]. This inci-
dent highlights that cutaneous infection can occur in 
fully vaccinated individuals and this presents a risk for 
transmission to people without up-to-date immunisa-
tion or with an impaired or waning immune response.
The presentation of skin infections due to toxigenic C. 
diphtheriae has been widely documented [18]. Between 
2007 and 2013 there were five imported cutaneous toxi-
genic C. diphtheriae infections in England [19]. Clinicians 
and laboratory staff should retain a high index of sus-
picion of C. diphtheriae and C. ulcerans in skin lesions 
from overseas travellers, even when patients are fully 
vaccinated. This has important implications for use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) by clinicians to 
whom patients may first present. In addition, C. diph-
theriae and C. ulcerans are classed as Hazard Group 2 
organisms and laboratory workers should determine 
their diphtheria antibody status, especially if they 
will potentially handle toxigenic corynebacteria [17]. It 
is notable that some clinicians exposed to the cases 
described in this report had uncertain immunisation 
status with regard to diphtheria.
The healthcare close contacts in the current event 
included GP practice staff with one GP practice 
impacted by exclusion at short notice of five staff 
from clinical duties leading to cancellation of patient 
appointments. The close contacts also included a spe-
cialist paediatric healthcare worker who could come 
into contact with unimmunised infants.
There was no dissemination outside of a close fam-
ily contact whose household the index case stayed 
at overnight; this echoes the experience of investiga-
tors of a household outbreak of toxigenic diphtheria in 
Norway in 2008 where there were three cases in unim-
munised individuals within the same family [20]. These 
cases developed a confluent, thick yellow membrane 
across their tonsils and peritonsillar tissue. In addi-
tion the index case developed the classic ‘bulls neck’ 
appearance. In the present report, no cases of classic 
diphtheria occurred.
The current transmission event highlights the impor-
tance of early diphtheria case ascertainment and a 
timely health protection response to protect vulnerable 
individuals. In this respect, the more widespread avail-
ability of MALDI-TOF in routine diagnostic laboratories 
offers an opportunity for improved and timelier identi-
fication of  C.  diphtheriae  and  C. ulcerans. This is also 
a welcome development in terms of the need to ensure 
diphtheria diagnostic capacity across all European 
Union/European Economic Area countries in light of 
important gaps identified by the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) [21]. Rapid real-
time PCR for the detection of potentially toxigenic iso-
lates also allows treatment and public health measures 
to be initiated more quickly than if relying on pheno-
typic toxigenicity testing alone.
Case 2 was initially prescribed erythromycin as chemo-
prophylaxis as a close contact before she was identified 
as a case – PHE recommended agents for chemopro-
phylaxis are either erythromycin (7 days) or, if more 
easily administered, a single intramuscular (IM) dose of 
benzylpenicillin. The case did not tolerate erythromycin 
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due to gastrointestinal symptoms therefore benzylpen-
icillin was administered. At the time chemoprophylaxis 
was offered the resistance to penicillin of the C. diph-
theriae strain had not been determined. Subsequently 
when offered treatment for diphtheria the case was 
reluctant to take further antibiotics following her 
experience of erythromycin. The national guidelines 
indicate that alternative macrolide antibiotics are 
available including clarithromycin and azithromycin.
Conclusion
This transmission event underlines the importance of 
timely investigation of cases and contact tracing to 
avoid further spread of disease. Clinicians and clinical 
laboratories must maintain a high degree of awareness 
of diphtheria, including the occurrence of skin lesions, 
especially in persons with a history of travel to coun-
tries where diphtheria is endemic.
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